



MORE WEAPONS TO UKRAINE NOW

*Report to global **United for Ukraine** parliamentary network on the need to immediately increase delivery of weapons to Ukraine*

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This report is based on public media sources, analyses, interviews with Western defence experts and Ukrainian defence officials and combatants on frontline in early May. Annex of the report includes data from the Kiel Institute for World Economy Ukraine support tracker. The report includes quotations from Dr Richard D Hooker's analysis "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond."

"I have seen Western weapons in our unit only from last week." - commander of a frontline unit.

"If we could have enough weapons, particularly long-range artillery with self-propelled shells, we could already free Mariupol." - Ukrainian senior officer.

"We have to use artillery ammunition in very limited daily rations, just to keep Russians away." - frontline combatant.

"Do you realize that we fight here for your freedom? We will win anyhow, but the price of your smaller aid will be our victims and war crimes committed in Ukraine." - frontline combatant.

Main findings

1. During the course of the war, Russia has not changed its intent to destroy Ukrainian statehood and its people. Therefore, prolonged war means inhumane atrocities and losses to Ukraine and vast security threats and other damage to the West.
2. Duration of the war depends on Western military aid. The West has passed two phases of aid delivery. It may reach to approximately 10 billion euros plus, but Ukraine is losing hundreds of millions of euros worth of destroyed weapons and ammunition per day in repurchase prices. Western military aid till now is far from even compensating the level Ukraine has lost. Now it's critical time to pass to the third phase, which means immediate delivery of weapons and ammunition worth 100 billion euros Ukraine has asked for, and to continue that on a consistent basis. In this context, the EU should enlarge its peace facility by up to 50 billion euros. This money would be spent on the EU home market and would rise the competitiveness of the EU military industry.
3. Enhanced weapons aid is the key element to deter war atrocities committed by the Russian Federation's army in Ukraine

4. Enhanced weapons delivery is the key element to avoid medium-perspective stalemate situation in the war, which could motivate Putin to escalate war (horizontally, empowering WMD or annihilating civilian population to deter Ukraine)
5. Western diplomacy must keep from the rhetoric of just stopping the fighting. The aim should be lasting peace, the precondition of which is Ukraine's victory on the ground.
6. Ukraine asks particularly for long-range artillery (towed and self-propelled), multiple launch rocket systems (particularly long-range), mid-range air defence systems, coastal defence systems (particularly land-based anti-ship missile systems), different types of military aircraft, kamikaze drones, combat UAV-s, main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, spare parts, and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions, reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare equipment and military communication systems.
7. There should be a consistent instruction system to Ukrainian soldiers. Western official instruction missions should be restored or appropriate interim solutions organized on the territory of the partner nations. To support military aid, a system of weapons reparation and logistics needs to be instated.
8. Approximately 200,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory needs to be demined. Western official non-military humanitarian demining operation needs to be launched.
9. Ukraine also needs coordinated home security and emergency services aid.
10. Russian nuclear threats need adequate deterrent response. During the war, the West must keep several possible courses of action open, not exclude any intents, which unfortunately happened in the debate over no-fly zone.

Supporting a swift Ukrainian victory

Ukrainian officials have seen in different stages of negotiations that Russia is not interested in a diplomatic solution but will continue trying to achieve its aim to destroy by force Ukrainian statehood and its people. Failure of the first military plans hasn't changed the strategic goals. Russia has on the ground 92 combat battalions and is militarily aiming to cut Ukraine from the Black Sea in south and occupy the whole eastern territory of Ukraine.

A protracted war is not in the interest of Ukraine or the West since it would inevitably increase human suffering and have a negative impact on global trade and thereby economic and social wellbeing. Still, ending the conflict at any cost must not become a goal. It would be unrealistic to expect the Russian military and security forces to stop raping, incarcerating, torturing, executing and deporting civilians on the occupied territories. Therefore, Ukraine must be supported with all the military equipment and supplies that are necessary to liberate the areas currently under Russian control, thereby restoring its territorial integrity.

Robust and immediate arms delivery to Ukraine with the aim of shortening the war is in the core interest of Western security and Ukraine. Dr Richard Hooker describes one possible scenario of coming months of the war as following:

„Should the campaign in Ukraine continue through the spring and into the summer without a decisive result, pressure on Putin and the Russian state will intensify. As sanctions bite, Russian casualties mount, and international support for Ukraine increases, the prospects for a decisive outcome in Russia’s favor will wither. Avoiding defeat and the security of the regime will become overriding priorities. Absent a diplomatic solution that can be sold as a Russian victory worth the sacrifice, Putin will persevere and act even more harshly.

Devastating cities to a higher degree. On the military front, if major Ukrainian urban areas continue to hold out, the range of available options for Russian forces will begin to shrink. Taking these cities intact by direct assault is unlikely, given the extraordinary losses already sustained, the low quality demonstrated by Russian conventional forces, and high Ukrainian morale. As lethal aid for Ukraine continues to flow, the Russian military will likely fall back on its remaining strengths. Chief among them is a prodigious amount of rocket and tubed artillery, and a vast inventory of Cold War-era munitions. More widespread use of thermobaric terror weapons like the 220-millimeter TOS-1 and TOS-2 systems, as well as white-phosphorous and napalm weapons, can be expected. With these, Russian forces can do more than attack cities; they can level them.

Direct-fire systems can be used in this mode as well. After initial failures in Grozny, Russian forces resorted to brute force, using tanks to demolish buildings with high-explosive rounds fired in great numbers from long range. Field artillery was also used in the direct-fire mode in Chechnya, with devastating results. In this way, lightly armed defenders with handheld anti-tank weapons were destroyed before they could attack Russian tanks. While fighting in cities poses many risks for Russian armor, one advantage is the greater difficulty faced by defenders in employing the top-attack Javelin in urban terrain. Once targeted urban areas have been reduced by devastating long-range fires, opportunities to engage and defeat the stunned and demoralized defenders improve. Demolishing large urban centers to destroy resistance will also affect the will to resist across Ukraine as a whole.

Redoubling efforts to achieve success in open-field combat. As summer approaches and off-road trafficability improves—and after a period of regrouping, retraining, and reorganization—Russian forces will redouble their efforts to encircle the mass of Ukrainian armor and artillery fighting in eastern Ukraine from north and south, an effort already under way. These represent a large part of the Ukrainian “first echelon” order of battle. President Zelenskyy has risked much by exposing these valuable forces to encirclement, but so far, the risk has paid off. If they are cut off and destroyed, the Ukrainian defense in the east will collapse (except for continued resistance by territorial defense forces in the cities and insurgency in the countryside). This kind of success will open the door for diplomatic opportunities, such as an offer of peace and cessation of hostilities in exchange for a guarantee of Ukrainian neutrality and the “demilitarization” of eastern Ukraine. Annexation of Luhansk and Donetsk will almost certainly follow.

Further cutting lines of communications and supply. At the operational level, Russian commanders in this phase will be seized with the importance of cutting ground lines of communication in western Ukraine used to resupply Ukrainian forces and keep the war going. Surprisingly effective Ukrainian air defense has inflicted heavy losses on Russian aircraft, which often launch their weapons from Belarus or Russian airspace. Aerial and missile fires can be employed against fixed sites like storage or transshipment points, but, at present, the Russian army does not have a strong ground presence in western Ukraine. Instead, more highly trained special-operations units

may be used to interdict ground convoys. As the campaign unfolds, sustained foreign assistance will mount in importance. “¹

To avoid such a scenario, the third phase of Western arms delivery should be urgently implemented.

Immediately before and after the Russian attack on 24 February 2022, Western countries typically provided a mix of relatively simple equipment, including helmets and ballistic vests, as well as man portable anti-tank and air defence weapons, automatic weapons and ammunition better suited for defensive operations. The weapons supplied to Ukraine appear to have made a significant difference in halting Russia’s military advance into the country. However, Russia started to focus more of its efforts on attacking cities, critical infrastructure and military positions with long-range rockets and artillery, which Western-supplied military aid could do little to counter. Ukraine therefore called for more and “bigger ticket” weapons to be supplied.²

¹ Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "[Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond](#)," Atlantic Council, 21 April 2022.

² John Curtis, Claire Mills, "[Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion](#)," House of Commons Library, 23 March 2022.



Destroyed Russian tank near Chernobyl

The next phase of the war has so far seen the deliveries of heavier equipment, including main battle tanks, other armoured vehicles, and artillery, some of which is ex-Soviet, but an increasing proportion originates from NATO countries. Shifting to artillery with NATO-compliant ammunition increases the possibilities of Western democracies to send more ammunition to Ukraine, including precision-guided munitions. Still, a significant proportion of this military support consists of legacy equipment, some of which will be difficult to sustain due to a lack of spare parts.

Given the aim to ensure Ukrainian victory, a third phase should be considered in which Western countries would transfer fully modern equipment amounting to €100 billion, including but not limited to long-range ground-based air defence missile systems, accepting a higher degree of risk through the negative impact on their national military capabilities. This risk for individual NATO members can be mitigated by other allies taking over their commitments temporarily, as this has been done previously through the Alliance's Defence Planning Process (NDPP). This transferred equipment would obviously have to be replaced in the future, using either national funding or other collective mechanisms such as the European Peace Facility (EPF).³ The size EPF should be increased to at least €50 billion which would also strengthen both the defence technological and industrial base and the linkages with Ukraine's armed forces and its defence industry.

Previous training missions of the Ukrainian military that were temporarily interrupted in February should be resumed to support the restoration of the nation's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

Last but not least, coordinating the military support to Ukraine requires more long-term systematic arrangements since these efforts, and in particular the through-life support of delivered equipment, are necessary to be maintained also after the war.

It is an imperative that NATO and EU member states and other likeminded countries adopt a sense of urgency in their support of Ukraine. Complacency, failure to act and deliberately belated decision-making would prolong the war, implicitly signal acceptance of Russia's aggressive action and therefore encourage future acts of aggression against other European nations.

Ensuring Secure Europe after Ukraine has Won the War Against Russia

A fully sovereign, democratic, and prosperous Ukraine integrated with the European and transatlantic security structures is in the interest of all Western and other

³ European External Action Service, The European Peace Facility, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-peace-facility-0_en.

likeminded countries and should be their strategic goal since it would ensure peace and stability in the Black Sea region and enhance the security of entire Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraine has the will to win the war against Russia, but a victory should not be taken for granted. The Ukrainian military suffers from a shortage of modern equipment, ammunition, and other supplies. Russia could bolster its worn-down forces by mobilizing reserves.⁴ To achieve the strategic goal, Ukraine must be provided with the military equipment and supplies necessary to liberate all occupied territories to restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. Defeating Russian forces in Ukraine is also the most effective way to prevent spill over onto NATO territory and other forms of future Russian aggression, and thus addressing future escalation risk.⁵ Dr Richard Hooker continues in his analysis:

„What can NATO and the European Union do to prevent Russia from escalating the conflict to unacceptable levels? What follows are a few principles to guide NATO’s assessment of preventing and avoiding escalation.

Keep Ukraine in the fight. The first, and most immediate, curative is to keep Ukraine in the war. This means continued financial assistance, shipments of lethal aid, and real-time intelligence sharing, as well as humanitarian assistance and help with absorption and resettlement of refugees. The United States and Europe have shown unity and concerted action in responding swiftly to Russian aggression in Ukraine and this must continue, even as Putin seeks to find and drive wedges between transatlantic allies and partners. In this struggle, a coherent narrative, shared and articulated in common, will be critical.

In this regard, continuous references to the danger of escalation to “World War III” and a steady drumbeat of measures *not* to be taken can only serve to reassure Putin that he has a free hand in Ukraine. A degree of strategic ambiguity and the possibility of US and NATO intervention should he go too far can be helpful in moderating Russian excesses and controlling escalation. An “all measures on the table” approach will force Russian planners to consider, and prepare for, multiple response scenarios,

⁴ Jack Watling, Nick Reynolds, "[Operation Z. The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion](#)," Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 22 April 2022.

⁵ Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "[Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond](#)," Atlantic Council, 21 April 2022.

complicating resource allocation and inducing uncertainty. While deterrence is more art than science, signaling to one's opponent that one is too frightened to engage is more likely to encourage than to deter.

The most effective way to prevent spillover onto NATO territory and other forms of future Russian aggression is to help defeat Russian forces in the field inside Ukraine. Supplying Ukraine with food, fuel, spare parts, and modern equipment is the best way to do that, while still avoiding direct intervention by NATO. This means combat aircraft, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled and rocket artillery, mobile air defense, secure radios, unmanned aerial vehicles, target-acquisition radars, spare parts, and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions. Many of these combat systems exist in storage in great numbers in the United States and in Europe. The Ukrainian military has shown remarkable versatility in adapting to unfamiliar systems such as the Javelin and Stinger, but exportable training packages, and even training sites in Europe for selected specialists, also warrant consideration. ⁶

However, this war is not only about the future of Ukraine.

Ensuring that Russia is unable to inflict serious damage also on other neighbouring countries is equally important both in the short and in the longer term. Both goals require considerable effort from the West and likeminded nations.⁷ While this may seem challenging, at least in the short term, history provides many examples of how such goals can be achieved.

Keeping Russia out

The West is able to weaken Russia economically and militarily to the extent that it no longer has the capability to conduct wars of conquest and genocide against its neighbours, including Ukraine. This can be achieved through a combination of tools that include long-term economic sanctions and embargos, to deny Russia access to financial resources and dual-use and military technology, as well as strengthening Western military and other relevant capabilities.

⁶ Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "[Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond](#)," Atlantic Council, 21 April 2022.

⁷ "[Blinken and Austin Emphasize U.S. Commitment to Ukraine on a Visit to Kyiv](#)," Time, 25 April 2022.

According to Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, the military alliance was created to "keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."⁸ Once Ukraine has won the war against Russia, Europe's security architecture must *keep Russia out, the Americans in, and the Germans engaged*. Russia has in recent months clearly demonstrated that it wages war in the same way it historically has done through systematic violations of international humanitarian law and laws of armed conflict. In the case of Ukraine, Russia's outspoken aim is even higher: to destroy the nation.

NATO needs to continue using its *deterrence by punishment* (inflicting on adversary unbearable costs) strategy and maintain, and possibly modernize, its nuclear deterrent while at the same time further developing its *deterrence by denial* (denying adversary success), through deploying enough conventional forces and capabilities to its Eastern flank to defend its member states against a Russian attack on Alliance territory.⁹ In addition to protecting their member states, NATO and the EU must strengthen the security and defence of Moldova and Georgia by developing a strategy, in cooperation with national authorities, and resource the implementation of it. The solution could be similar to the donation and support of defence equipment along with training of national armed forces.

The aforementioned tools will only prove successful if the West acts fast and maintains a maximum level of unity and signals strength, instead of weakness and disunity as was the case after Russia's 2008 war against Georgia and 2014 war against Ukraine.¹⁰

⁸ NATO, Lord Ismay, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm

⁹ Michael J. Mazarr, "[Understanding Deterrence](#)," Rand Corporation, 2018.

¹⁰ Dumitru Minzarari, "[Failing to Deter Russia's War against Ukraine: The Role of Misperceptions](#)," Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, April 2022.



Destroyed residential buildings in Irpin

The war has entered a new and decisive phase that involves Russian large-scale offensive action in eastern and southern Ukraine. It destroys vital infrastructure, subjects the population to atrocities and displaces people at an alarming scale and speed not seen since the Second World War.

Western and other countries have since 24 February 2022 made public commitments to deliver weapon systems, ammunition and other supplies amounting to 10 billion euros. However, significant parts of the announced decisions have so far not been implemented.

War losses have been massive to the aggressor, but Ukraine bears the cost of military equipment, ammunition, and other supplies spent amounting to approximately 400 million euros per day in repurchase value, not to mention the humanitarian and economic costs inflicted on its society and economy.

It is an imperative that NATO and EU member states and other likeminded countries adopt a sense of urgency in their support of Ukraine. Complacency, failure to act and deliberately belated decision-making would inexplicitly signal acceptance of Russia's aggressive action and therefore encourage future aggressions against other European nations. This must not happen.

We wish to stress the irrelevance of some arguments, which have been used to avoid a more decisive arms delivery policy.

First, that *the delivery of heavy weapon systems would escalate the war and should therefore be avoided*. Over the last weeks, the positive decisions made by several countries to deliver heavy weaponry have clearly demonstrated that this paradigm is incorrect. Therefore, there are no reasons why heavy offensive weapons that Ukraine has requested cannot be delivered. The delivery of such weapons is the most important means to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, to shorten the war and to minimise human suffering.

Second, that *Ukrainian military personnel could not be trained to use sophisticated Western weapon systems, including ground-based air defence systems, multiple*

launch rocket systems, self-propelled howitzers, and main battle tanks. This is incorrect. Training can be provided for all above mentioned weapon systems within much compressed timelines allowing the Armed Forces of Ukraine to take them into use within weeks and certainly not more than a few months.

Third, that *delivering military equipment and supplies to Ukraine takes time.* Practice shows, that with dedicated will, from a political decision of the donor state to send weapon systems to the front lines, it takes only a few days from all parts of the European continent and even North America and Australia.

Fourth, that delivery of military equipment will harm our own defence capabilities in significant manner. This is also incorrect. The collective West has enough industrial capacity, and financial resources to continue both increasing own military capabilities and aiding Ukraine. The current situation does warrant an immediate ramp-up of production capacity of the defence industrial base throughout NATO and the EU. However, if Russia were to achieve strategic gains on the ground because of this war, it would significantly increase the already existing threat to the European continent and in particular to the NATO and EU member states that border Russia. Holding assistance back for the fear of needing it to counter Russia in the future on NATO's and EU's territory almost ensures that such future becomes a reality.

NATO is and will remain the world's most powerful alliance. The most significant elements of NATO's deterrence remain intact despite the deliveries of conventional military equipment and supplies to Ukraine. The strategic and long-term benefits from a fully sovereign, democratic, and prosperous Ukraine would far outweigh the potential military capability gaps among NATO and EU member states that temporarily would occur as a result of providing this support. Also, Russia's conventional capabilities have and will continue to decrease as a result of this war even though it is difficult to assess exactly how much time it will take to restore these capabilities.

Ukraine has requested long-range artillery, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, coastal defence systems, different types of military aircraft, attack drones, main battle tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, ammunition and many other types of weaponry and supplies.

We should now, in this critical phase of the war, not measure our efforts to deliver arms in monetary terms, but by the ability to address the military capability gaps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Therefore, we ask all NATO and EU member states, as well as other likeminded countries, to immediately:

1. Make available and deliver the military equipment, ammunition and other supplies that Ukraine has requested;
2. Coordinate these deliveries both with other Western and likeminded countries and with Ukraine;
3. Declare jointly that they will continue the supply of weapons and ammunition, as requested by Ukraine, until its territorial integrity has been restored;
4. Provide all necessary training and logistical support necessary for Ukraine to be able to operate and sustain those fielded capabilities.
5. Support development of Ukrainian defence industry capabilities to provide maintenance and repair cycle of provided weapons and military equipment.

We commend the US-led initiative (the global contact group founded by 40 Ministers of Defence in Ramstein, Germany, on the 26 April) and urge that initiative to upgrade military aid to Ukraine to the third phase.

Ukrainian soldiers will not give up, they are looking on us from trenches

It has to be stressed that in all meetings with officers and soldiers of Ukraine forces, either at the frontline or command points we felt their steadfast determination to continue resistance and defend their homeland and people. This is a major argument, which needs to be taken into consideration. Ukrainian soldiers are committed to fighting and capable of learning to use unfamiliar weapon systems. It means that Western weapons are effectively used. No soldier used any personal arguments that they are unsafe because of lacking armoury. They stressed that they are ready to die for their homeland. But in many cases, they described in detailed manner how the lack of just a few particular weapons made it operatively possible for Russians to attack or made it impossible for them to keep the front.

Their message from the frontline to the West has first a security perspective: do you understand that we are now defending you? And second, the most important, moral one: when we are lacking arms, our people, our families behind both lines are dying.

They are right in both arguments.



Old Maxim-type machine gun used at defence line


**Annex Bilateral Western military aid 24 Jan-23 April
2022. Source: Kiel Institute for World Economy Ukraine
support tracker¹¹**

Country	Military aid (disclosed commitments only)	Total
United States	3,995591072	10,31422798
Poland	1,469566547	2,397328292
Germany	1,342233039	1,81465795
United Kingdom	0,770636842	2,096252182
Canada	0,697816638	1,947816638
Latvia	0,22	0,226367418
Estonia	0,22	0,221647014
Slovakia	0,196364269	0,201364269
France	0,150518968	0,566989915
Italy	0,15	0,264757968
Sweden	0,126763722	0,316150823
Denmark	0,085601954	0,123746383
Czech Republic	0,070988185	0,089158817
Netherlands	0,050212051	0,148561964
Lithuania	0,049	0,0925
Ireland	0,033	0,097931507
Belgium	0,019948103	0,103178103
Slovenia	0,018533534	0,020336534
Croatia	0,016394526	0,017798215
Greece	0,013923834	0,013923834
Finland	0,010269128	0,02467328
Portugal	0,01	0,01
Spain	0,004021882	0,046259359
Luxembourg	0,003032034	0,253032034
Romania	0,003	0,004012897
Austria	0,00023698	0,010948838
Japan	0	0,275558005
Hungary	0	0,007336934
Cyprus	0	0,001837053
Malta	0	0,00115

¹¹ <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/kiel-working-papers/2022/ukraine-tracker-17204/>

Bulgaria	0	0
SUM	9,727653308	

**Government support to Ukraine: Military Aid, € billion, Commitments
24 Jan to 23 April 2022.**



Note: This figure shows a ranking of the 15 Western governments (out of 31) that have offered military aid to Ukraine between January 24 and April 23, 2022. We exclude humanitarian and financial aid and do not consider EU (Commission and Council) contributions.